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I. INTRODUCTION
Passed in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides
federal protection of workers' rights.' Specifically, Section 7 of the NLRA pro-
tects the rights of workers to organize and engage in collective bargaining.2
Before 1935, state law governed most labor relations and management issues.
Once the NLRA was passed, much of this state law was preempted in favor of
new national standards, to the extent these standards covered the same ground as
the state law.3 However, Congress failed to specify which state law still had
preeminence over any federal labor law. Especially troublesome is the residual
dichotomy of the NLRA and state workers compensation laws. This essay criti-
* Dorothy Day Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; J.S.D., 1987, Yale
Law School. Edward McNamara, A.B., Harvard College, 2004, St. John's Law Class of 2009,
furnished superb research assistance. St. John's University School of Law provided a faculty
research summer grant.
1 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
2 Id.
3 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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cally analyzes the bizarre bifurcation afflicting Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act as it relates to the workers compensation schema.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which investigates unfair
labor practices, and various circuit courts of appeals have created a pernicious
dichotomy, holding that employees injured at work who invoke state law4 work-
ers' compensation benefits are not engaging in NLRA Section 7 concerted, pro-
tected activities. Thus, retaliatory actions by vindictive employers against in-
jured employees asserting workers' compensation claims pursuant to state law
are not prohibited by the NLRA. Meanwhile, employees who complain of un-
safe5 or unhealthy working conditions continue to be properly regarded by the
NLRB and the courts of appeals as within the ambit of Section 7.
Consequently, employer retaliation against such employees engaging in
Section 7 concerted, protected activities of reporting unsafe, unhealthy working
conditions to federal or state or local agencies would constitute employer unfair
labor practices in violation of the NLRA. The NLRB, the courts of appeals, and,
ultimately, the Supreme Court must restore NLRA Section 7 protections to the
former bloc of employees, and thus eliminate this pointless distinction between
classes of employees injured by unsafe and unhealthy workplaces, and those
only subject to unsafe and unhealthy workplaces.6
4 The legal framework for workers' compensation insurance is largely made up of state statu-
tory law and provides for monetary benefits, medical benefits, and rehabilitation for employees
injured as a result of or in the course of their employment. Workers compensation is a no-fault
system in lieu of jury trials, making employers strictly liable to accidentally injured employees,
without regard to negligence of the employee or the employer. Workers' compensation is a widely
used system. For example, New York State, with 8.6 million workers, has approximately 150,000
workers compensation claims annually filed by injured workers. States have had to address claims
that their workers' compensation statutes are invalid and contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. In 1911, the New York Court of Appeals pronounced the New
York State workers' compensation law unconstitutional, depriving employers of their property
without due process of law, but the law was subsequently reenacted, and significantly revised in
2007. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 317 (1911); Steven Greenhouse & N.R.
Kleinfield, Deal in Albany Overhauls Worker Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at A3. See general-
ly Price V. Fishback, Workers' Compensation, EH NET ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/
article/fishback.workers.compensation.
5 Occupational safety and health is a coordinated federal and state law regulatory regime, with
the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 as its iconic and controversial modern
statutory cornerstone. Approximately 14 million employees develop medical conditions due to
unsafe or unhealthy working conditions every year; there are approximately 6,000 workplace
fatalities annually. See J.P. Leigh, S.B. Markowitz, and M. Fahs, Occupational Injury and Illness
in the United States: Estimates of Costs, Morbidity, and Mortality, 157 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED.
1557, 1568 (1997); see also ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2008)(1952); Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating
Risk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistence of Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. L. REV. 119
(1994).
6 Prominent scholars have called for reinvigoration of Section 7. See Richard Michael Fischl,
Self Other, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 789 (1989); B. Glenn George, Divided We Stand: Concerted
Activity and the Maturing of the NLRA, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 509 (1988); Michael M. Oswalt,
(Vol. I111
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In NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc. in 1984, the United States Su-
preme Court unequivocally held that a single employee acting alone can never-
theless be engaged in concerted Section 7 activity.7 In that landmark decision,
truck driver James Brown voiced his concerns to supervision about unsafe con-
ditions on the truck he refused to drive. Supervision cynically replied that half
of the truck fleet was unsafe and said that if "it tried to fix all of them it would
be unable to do business"8-meanwhile, there was garbage to haul. Driver
Brown then asked one of the classic rhetorical, plaintive questions in labor his-
tory, a paradigm for how the individual employee nevertheless can act on behalf
of the collective bargaining unit: "[Supervisor] Bob [Madary], what are you
going to do, put the garbage ahead of the safety of the men?" 9 Obviously, yes.
Mr. Brown was fired, for refusing to drive the truck with the bad brakes. If the
employer could have had its way, it would have operated entirely unfettered by
the inconvenient constraints of the law. The Court recognized that there can be
no real distinction between the employee who complains today about unsafe
equipment and perhaps the very same employee injured tomorrow by the unsafe
equipment.10 It makes no sense whatsoever to exclude tomorrow's injured
worker from the protection of Section 7.
Throughout much of the presidency of George W. Bush, the National
Labor Relations Board has aggressively and relentlessly constricted the scope of
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act." Notwithstanding these relative-
The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor Through NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations,
57 DuKE L.J. 691 (2007).
7 465 U.S. 822 (1984). See George, supra note 6, at 509; Raymond T. Mak, City Disposal
Systems and the Interboro Doctrine: The Evolution of the Requirement of "Concerted Activity"
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 265 (1985); Mitchell H.
Rubinstein, Is a Full Labor Relations Evidentiary Privilege Developing?, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 221 (2008).
8 N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Systems Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 827 (1984).
9 Id.
10 See id. at 830-38.
11 Perhaps the single most radical decision deeply antithetical to employees' Section 7 rights is
Guard Publishing Co (Register-Guard), 351 NLRB No. 70 (2007), rendered in the context of
cyberspace communications, rather than in the arena of safety and health per se. NLRB held that
employees had no Section 7 right to send pro-union emails on the employer's computers, utterly
and completely failing to recognize that emails are contemporary equivalents of Republic Avia-
tion solicitation, circa 1945. Dissenting Members Liebman and Walsh said that the "decision
confirms that the NLRB has become the 'Rip Van Winkle of administrative agencies." Id. at 17.
For commentary on the NLRB's spasmodic and unreal failure to understand the labor law ramifi-
cations of cyberspace, see Frederick D. Rapone, Jr., This is Not Your Grandfather's Labor Un-
ion-Or Is It?: Exercising Section 7 Rights in the Cyberspace Age, 39 DuQ. L. REv. 657 (2001)
and Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 262 (2008). See also Kenneth R. Dolin, Battista Board's Legacy, NAT. L. J., July 7, 2008, at
12. ("Most labor law practitioners would acknowledge the importance of many decisions issued
by the Battista Board. Likewise, most would acknowledge that the Battista Board swung the legal
pendulum back toward management in the following areas: . . . limiting 'protected' activi-
ty/expanding unprotected activity .... ). There is voluminous critical literature regarding the
3
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ly recent impairments, my critique proceeds from a somewhat different perspec-
tive, focusing on starkly contradictory and jurisprudentially incoherent NLRB
and circuit courts of appeals decisions that purport to remove employees' exer-
cise of statutory workers' compensation rights from the protections of Section 7
of the NLRA. Ironically, this has occurred in the wake of September 11, after
the Board itself has sua sponte invoked national security concerns and expressly
reminded everyone that the workplace can be a very dangerous place indeed.'
2
]I. THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM
Employees who are injured in accidents on the job and file for workers'
disability insurance compensation benefits are, incredibly, not deemed to have
acted within the bounds of, and are thus not protected by, Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Their individual claims are considered to be just
that: individual claims under state workers' compensation law, without any con-
certed, collective dimension. No matter how many workers are injured in recur-
ring accidents due to unsafe conditions, their claims for benefits following inju-
ries sustained in workplace accidents, as well as any actions for unlawful retalia-
tion as a consequence of pursuing their state law workers' compensation statuto-
ry rights, are not protected, concerted activities for purposes of Section 7 of the
NLRtA.13
National Labor Relations Board. See generally David L. Gregory, The Long View of the NLRA at
70... Or, the More Things Change?, 56 LAB. L. J. 172 (2005) (Introduction to a Symposium on
the 7 0
th anniversary of the NLRA). The NLRA and the NLRB have had vociferous, ideological
critics from the inception. See generally David L. Gregory, The National Labor Relations Board
and the Politics of Labor Law, 27 B.C. L. REv. 39 (1985) (summarizing some of the more egre-
gious early criticisms of the NLRA and of the NLRB); David L. Gregory & Raymond T. Mak,
Significant Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, 1984: the Reagan Board's 'Celebra-
tion' of the 50th Anniversary of the National Labor Relations Act, 18 CONN. L. REv. 7 (1985).
Stanford Law Professor William B. Gould IV, Chairman of the NLRB during the Clinton Admin-
istration, wrote Labored Relations, a bitter, hilarious memoir of his frustrations as the Chair of the
Board. The Board during the Presidency of George W. Bush may be the most radically activist in
the history of the NLRB. See William R. Corbett, The Narrowing of the National Labor Relations
Act: Maintaining Workplace Decorum and Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23
(2006); Jeffrey Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA, 76 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
262; Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National
Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569 (2007); Senator Arlen Specter & Eric
S. Nguyen, Representation Without Intimidation: Securing Workers' Right to Choose Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 45 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 311 (2008).
12 In IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004), for example, the Board sua sponte found that
national security after 9/11 was one factor in the Board's decision removing from non-unionized
employees the Weingarten right to representation in employer investigatory interviews. "Further,
because of the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath, we must now take into account
the presence of both real and threatened terrorist attacks. Because of these events, the policy
considerations expressed In du Pont have taken on any new vitality." Id. at 1291.
13 NLRA proceedings are before an Administrative Law Judge-there are no juries, and no
compensatory damages. The NILRA should nevertheless be available as a backstop or a floor for
[Vol. 111
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Tell that to the thousands injured at their workplace, the World Trade
Center, on September 11.1 4 According to the jurisprudential schizophrenia af-
flicting Section 7, each injured employee claiming workers' compensation bene-
fits is, amazingly enough, not considered to be engaged in a Section 7 con-
certed, protected activity, and any subsequent employer retaliation for the em-
ployee pursuing statutory state workers' compensation law benefits is not prohi-
bited by Section 7.
Meanwhile, however, the NLRB and the courts of appeals continue,
quite properly, to regard safety and health complaints per se as Section 7 pro-
tected, concerted activities. Thus, the fundamental cornerstone of federal labor
law has been artificially and radically bifurcated: worker assertions of safety and
health issues continue to come within Section 7's umbrella, as protected, con-
certed activity, while workers injured in classic accidents arising from the same
unsafe conditions do not have Section 7 protections against unlawful employer
retaliation for having exercised their state workers' compensation rights.
For example, an employee slips and falls and breaks an arm in the mid-
dle of a factory floor, due to an accidental spill of grease and oil-the classic
accident at work, is covered by state workers' compensation insurance law.
Although the potentially recurrent oil spill poses a direct threat to the health and
safety of other employees, the employee filing for workers' compensation insur-
ance is deemed to have only an individual claim unique to the employee, and
utterly without any Section 7 collective dimensions or ramifications if the em-
ployee is retaliated against for having filed for workers' compensation benefits
pursuant to state law. Meanwhile, the same grease and oil spill may trigger an
investigation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
especially since other employees remain exposed to the potentially recurrent
hazard and could sustain similar future injuries. The individual employee who
brings the matter to the attention of OSHA is deemed to be engaged in pro-
tected, concerted activity under the umbrella of Section 7 of the NLRA. While a
few articles have touched indirectly upon this manifest incongruity, none has yet
analyzed in any integrated fashion the major NLRB and courts of appeals deci-
sions that have, if anything, further accelerated and exacerbated the bifurcation
of Section 7.
workers, in the event that, for example, their state workers' compensation system is dysfunctional,
broke, not timely paying benefits, or not properly providing for medical treatment.
14 The landmark study of the workers' compensation experience of first responders is Eli N.
Avila, Jacqueline Moline, John Doucette & Elizabeth Hill, Responders to the World Trade Center
Disaster and Their Ensuing New York State Workers Compensation Sequelae (2008) (Draft on file
with the author).
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I. THE RADICAL REMOVAL OF NLRA SECTION 7 PROTECTIONS FROM
INJURED WORKERS EXERCISING WORKERS' COMPENSATION STATE LAW
STATUTORY RIGHTS
So, whatever happened to the old Wobblies15 axiom, "An injury to one
is an injury to all!"?
The collective, communitarian principle at the heart of Section 7 has
been cruelly transmogrified into the ruthlessly Darwinian law of the (super)
capitalist 16 jungle-"every man for himself!" For injured employees trapped in
this bleak scenario, misery is virtually guaranteed, exacerbated by the unavaila-
bility of the protections of Section 7 of the NLRA.
Pursuing statutory workers' compensation rights under state law re-
gimes is not protected activity under Section 7. While the United States Su-
preme Court periodically considers the parameters of Section 7, the Court has
never directly addressed, let alone definitively resolved, this specific issue. The
divorce from Section 7 protections of injured workers exercising state workers'
compensation statutory rights has been unequivocally, if summarily, pro-
nounced by United States Courts of Appeals in several circuits, as well as by the
National Labor Relations Board.
The NLRB, or the Board, and the federal courts of appeals have with-
drawn the Section 7 protections in summary, cursory fashion, without furnishing
any rationale of any depth or significance. Rather, there has been a reflexive
implicit deference to radical Jeffersonian states' rights federalism by judicial
fiat, without examining the pernicious ramifications that the deprivation of Sec-
tion 7 protections ineluctably have for injured, vulnerable employees.
In a two-step of judicial jujitsu, the NLRB and the federal courts of ap-
peals first engage in the blatant legal fiction that the injured employee's invoca-
tion of state workers' compensation law statutory rights is a purely individual
act, not a concerted, protected activity within the meaning of Section 7. This is
a particularly poignant repudiation of labor reality. It is also exquisitely ironic,
since much of labor solidarity and collective consciousness was catalyzed by the
horrific loss of life among largely immigrant young women workers in the noto-
rious Shirtwaist Triangle factory fire in Manhattan nearly a century ago.1 7 Coin-
cidentally, this disaster was also the social catalyst spurring enactment of state
workers' compensation laws throughout the nation.
15 The Industrial Workers of the World, the "Wobblies," founded in Chicago in June 1905,
celebrated their centennial in 2005. See Paul Buhle, A Cosmic Celebration: The 101Yh Anniversary
of the IWW, 14 NEw LAB. F. 121 (2005).
16 Robert Reich, the former U.S. Secretary of Labor during the Clinton Administration, sug-
gests that supercapitalism has mutated into forms that even the most sophisticated capitalists do
not understand, and certainly are unable to control. Ultimately, supercapitalism threatens democ-
racy. ROBERT REICH, SUPERCAPrrALISM (The Power of Public Ideas ed., Alfred A. Knoff 2007).
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Under the dichotomized Section 7 regime today, a factory girl reporting
a fire hazard at a contemporary sweatshop would, at least theoretically, be pro-
tected against employer retaliation by Section 7. But, if she were injured while
physically removing the fire hazard or in an actual fire, and she filed for work-
ers' compensation and was retaliated against by the employer because she filed
for workers' compensation, she would not be protected by Section 7. Today, the
Board and the courts simply assume that injured workers exercising statutory
workers' compensation rights under state law are adequately and fully protected
by those particular state law regimes against unlawful retaliatory actions-such
as termination from employment-by vengeful employers.' 8 Why burden the
scenario with redundant NLRA Section 7 clutter, pointlessly confusing with
needless complexity the state law avenue of recourse available to injured work-
ers believing they have been unlawfully retaliated against by employers for hav-
ing filed workers' compensation claims? Therefore, under this scheme, even the
most egregious unlawful employer retaliation, which would surely be an NLRA
unfair labor practice in virtually any other context, is irrelevant for Section 7
purposes when it stems from workers' compensation claims.
A. A Synoptic Review of Salient NLRB and Circuit Courts of Appeals Deci-
sions Regarding NLRA Section 7 (Non) Availability in the Workers'
Compensation Context
The Supreme Court held in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon
that when an activity to which the state law would attach liability is "arguably
protected" or "arguably prohibited" by the NLRA, the state law is preempted. 19
However, the state law is not preempted if the activity is only a "peripheral"
concern to NLRA. 20 In Peabody Galion v. Dollar, the filing of workers' com-
pensation claims was viewed by the court of appeals as only a "peripheral" con-
cern of the NLRA.21 As such, the Oklahoma state law regulating the issue was
not preempted, and the filing of claims was held not to be an NLRA protected
activity.
The Garmon labor preemption doctrine has since been transmogrified
into a blunt instrument antithetical to workers' rights. It presents a stark "either
18 All states have workers' compensation laws, but not all of the laws necessarily have subs-
tantive provisions protecting workers against the employer's unlawful retaliation. See ARTHUR
LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 104.07[1] (Matthew Bender & Co.,
Inc. 2007). In those instances, where unscrupulous employers are unconcerned about state work-
ers' compensation law as weak and ineffectual, such employers may think twice before unlawful
retaliation if they know that the federal government, the NLRA/NLRB, may come into the en-
forcement and compliance picture.
19 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 359 U.S. 236, 243-245 (1959). See generally David L.
Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 507 (1986).
20 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 359 U.S. at 243.
21 Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1317-19 (10th Cir. 1981).
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or" dilemma-namely, either injured workers are protected exclusively by Sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA preempting all state law, or their recourse must be exclu-
sively through state workers' compensation law.
More than coincident with the ascendancy of the Reagan administration
and the Supreme Court's corresponding turn towards radical Jeffersonian states'
rights federalism, the labor preemption doctrine declared more than two decades
earlier by the Supreme Court became a perverse instrument for the suppression
of workers' rights. The Reagan Board repeatedly slammed the door on injured
workers in communication with state workers' compensation offices. One need
not file for benefits; apparently, according to the Reagan Board, simply speak-
ing with the state law workers' compensation regime is sufficient to fall outside
the ambit of Section 7.22
Just before the Reagan presidency, in 1979, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board analyzed a Section 8(a)(1) employer unfair labor practice in viola-
tion of the NLRA in Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., determining that an em-
ployer discharging an employee for expressing his intention to file a workers'
compensation claim committed an unfair labor practice.23 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, overruled the NLRB, refused to order enforcement
of the NLRB's decision, and used the opportunity to disavow Section 7's appli-
cability in the state workers' compensation context. 24 The court held that an
employee filing a claim was not engaging in a "concerted activity," and that the
NLRB's efforts to create a concerted activity were manifestly wrong:
Our circuit has indicated that the term 'concerted activity'
means that the employee must be acting 'with or on behalf of
other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the dis-
charged employee himself.' . . . The Board in effect concedes
that there is no evidence that the action of the solitary employee
in this case intended or contemplated any group activity or that
22 Alcan Cable, 269 N.L.R.B. 184, 184-85 (1984); Central Georgia Electric Corp., 269
N.L.R.B. 635, 637 (1984) (Unionized employee pursuing workers' compensation rights was un-
lawfully denied reinstatement, having been deleted from a list of strikers on workers' compensa-
tion leave during the strike.); MEMC Electronic Materials, 342 N.L.R.B. 1172 (2004). See Brian
Christensen and David M. Kight, Section 7 And The Non-Union Employer, 60 J. Mo. B. 312
(2004); Gregory & Mak, supra note 11, at 7; Christina A. Karcher, The Supreme Court Takes One
Step Forward and the NLRB Takes One Step Backward: Redefining Constructive Concerted Ac-
tivities, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1295 (1985).
23 Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers Internation-
al Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, 245 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Cen-
tral Georgia Electric Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 635 (1984); see Michael J. Belo, Changing Concepts of
Protected Concerted Activities, 14 CoLO. LAW. 1207 (1985); Matthew W. Finkin & Robert A.
Gorman, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286 (1981); B. Glenn George, Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity and
the Maturing of the NLRA, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 509 (1988); Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory
Arbitration be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 173 (2003).
24 Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 635 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 111
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he was 'in fact ... acting on behalf of or as representative of,
other employees;' at most his action can be said to have been
'for the benefit of other employees only in a theoretical sense.'
25
In 1981, the Tenth Circuit unequivocally held, in Peabody Galion, that
the employer's termination of employees in retaliation for filing workers' com-
pensation claims is not prohibited as an unfair labor practice within the meaning
of the NLRA.26 The court summarily declared:
The conduct at issue in this case--discharge of workers because
they pursued workers' compensation claims-is not subject to
either protection or prohibition by the National Labor Relations
Act because it has nothing whatsoever to do with union organi-
zation and collective bargaining .... Likewise the underlying
activity that provoked the conduct complained of-that is, the
filing of workermen's compensation claims under state law-
has no tendency to conflict with the National Labor Relations
Act or the federal law.
Even if discharges related to workmen's compensation claims
were covered by federal law, the discharges would more likely
be prohibited than protected. It is inconceivable that there
would be state court interference with federal labor policy in
connection with the present type of statute....
The activity present in the case before us bears little resem-
blance to that found to be federally protected .... There has
been no special congressional consideration of workermen's
compensation related discharges. Moreover, discharging work-
ers because they have filed claims has nothing to do with col-
lective bargaining. It cannot be classed as an essential aspect of
25 Id. at 306-08.
26 Peabody Galion, 666 F.2d at 1316. See Kingsley R. Browne & Raymond L. Wheeler, Fed-
eral Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Actions, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1986); Andrea G.
Lisenbee & Michael D. Moberly, Honing Our Kraft?: Reconciling Variations in the Remedial
Treatment of Weingarten Violations, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 523 (2003); Jean C. Love,
Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers' Compensation Claim: The Development of a Modem
Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551 (1986); Peter Zablotsky, The Continuing Availability of Retalia-
tory Discharge and Other State Tort Causes of Action to Employees Covered by Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, 56 ALB. L. REv. 371 (1992).
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the economic forces which enter into the shaping of viable labor
agreements ....
There is one other exception that we have discussed .... That
is the tenuous relationship between the federal labor laws of the
remedy that is here being challenged. In other words, the con-
cern of the federal labor laws is, to say the least, peripheral and
tenuous.27
In 1985, the Tenth Circuit reinforced its summary conclusion in Peabo-
dy Galion, reiterating that the employer's dismissal of employees filing work-
ers' compensation claims is not prohibited by the NLRA.28
According to the Eleventh Circuit in 1987, employees fired for entering
into a monetary settlement of workers' compensation claims, in violation of the
employer's policy against entering into such settlements, have no recourse under
Section 7.29
Unfortunately, the current legal regime does not recognize that injured
employees manifestly deserve the integrated protections of both Section 7 of the
NLRA and state workers' compensation law, just as employees reporting unsafe
conditions have the protection of Section 7 of the NLRA and of the various fed-
eral, state, and local laws designed to insure safe workplaces. Meaningful fede-
ralism should eschew the radical "either or" jurisprudential choice of either only
Section 7 or only state workers' compensation law exclusively governing the
field, and instead endorse an integrated regime of federal and state law protec-
tions.
B. The Continuing Relevance of Section 7 in the Workplace Safety and
Health Context
It is generally accepted that Section 7 of the NLRA protects the em-
ployee who files a safety and health complaint with the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). This principle further illuminates the Section 7
dichotomy because if the same employee who complains of unsafe, unhealthy
working conditions is actually injured by these conditions, he may be fired for
filing a state workers' compensation claim and would not be protected by Sec-
tion 7.
27 Peabody Galion, 666 F.2d at 1316-19.
28 Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The court ana-
lyzed the relationship between Dollar's statutory claim and the NLRA, and concluded that the
discharge of workers because they filed workers' compensation claims is not protected or prohi-
bited by the NLRA and is unrelated to the collective bargaining agreement.").
29 Zartic, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 810 F.2d 1080 (11 th Cir. 1987).
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Despite a tumultuous history surrounding the issue, especially concern-
ing the interpretation of Section 7 concerted, protected activity, National Labor
Relations Board decisions continue to hold that filing a safety and health claim
with OSHA is protected activity under Section 7 of the NLRA.3 ° It has not been
a jurisprudential straight line by any means, and the Board's now long-standing
refusal to accord Section 7 protections to injured employees asserting state
workers' compensation law statutory rights is all the more glaring and aberra-
tional vis-A-vis any possible integrated understanding of Section 7.
Prior to the enactment in 1970 of the now-cornerstone federal law re-
garding workplace safety and health, the Occupational Safety and Health Act,3'
the NLRB had long held that an employee's filing of health complaints was
protected activity under Section 7 of the NLRA.32 And, after the effectuation of
OSHA in 1970, the Board did not change its view. In 1975, for example, the
NLRB, in Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc., held that filing a complaint under OSHA
was Section 7 concerted, protected activity.33
The evolution of the law following the NLRB's decision in Alleluia was
tumultuous at best. Six years later, the Board overruled its Alleluia decision. In
Meyers Industries, Inc., the Board resurrected an "objective" test for defining
Section 7 concerted activities that existed before Alleluia.34 This standard main-
tains that an employee's activity is concerted only if the activity is "engaged in
with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of
the employee himself.,
35
This objective standard was attacked the following year in 1985 in Prill
v. N.L.R.B. (Prill ).36 In Prill I, the District of Columbia Circuit Court relied on
the Supreme Court's holding in N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Systems Inc. where
30 The NLRB has consistently held that employee complaints to OSHA are protected, con-
certed Section 7 activities. See, e.g., Systems with Reliability Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 757, 760 (1996)
("The Company discharged Yuhas because he engaged in concerted activity protected under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. The action which precipitated Yuhas' discharge, i.e., his statement that he
would complain to OSHA, was one step in the concerted efforts of the three welders to improve
safety and health conditions in the workplace. By saying that he would contact OSHA, Yuhas
engaged in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid and protection;" protected under
Section 7 of the Act.); In re Garage Mgmt. Corp., 334 N.L.R.B. 940, 951 (2001); In re U.S. Postal
Service, 338 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1057 (2003) ("The Respondent may not lawfully seize upon an inci-
dent... to retaliate against one for engaging in activity protected by section 7 of the Act, such as
filing an OSHA complaint.").
31 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
32 Walls Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding that "complaining of
[poor] sanitary conditions at employer's premises ... was protected activity [under Section 7 of
the NLRA]).
33 Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1001 (1975), overruled by Prill v. N.L.R.B.,
755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
34 Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 496 (1984) (Meyers 1).
35 Id. at 497.
36 Prill 1, 755 F.2d at 948-57.
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the Court rejected a literal reading of "concerted activities. 37 The Court in City
Disposal held that "section 7 does not compel a narrowly literal interpretation of
'concerted activities,' but rather is to be construed by the Board in light of its
expertise in labor relations. 38 The circuit court in Prill I held that the Board in
Meyers I effectively failed to interpret "concerted activities" beyond the most
narrow definition of joint action by employees. The Meyers I Board's failure
was that it did not "recognize the extent of its own interpretative authority."
39
However, while criticizing the Board's interpretation in Meyers I, the circuit
court did not state that the objective test was an unreasonable interpretation of
Section 7.40
Following Prill I, in 1986 the NLRB stated in Meyers H that its standard
in Meyers I for determining whether activity is concerted, and that its rejection
of the Alleluia decision, were both reasonable and consistent with City Dispos-
al.4 1 This decision was subsequently affirmed in Prill II by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court.42
The development of this area of law was, to say the least, less than li-
near. Ultimately, however, the NLRB continues to hold that the worker's exer-
cise of the federal OSHA statutory right to file a safety or health claim under
OSHA is Section 7 protected activity. In 2006, in T. Steele Construction, Inc., 3
the Board expressly reaffirmed that the worker's act of complaining to OSHA
about safety conditions is protected activity: "T. Steele was aware that Farrell
had engaged in protected activity by complaining to OSHA about the Respon-
dent's safety practices, and was contemplating making further such com-
plaints."" Most recently, in 2007, the Board, in Stevens Construction Co., found
that an employee calling OSHA to report unsafe working conditions engaged in
Section 7 concerted, protected activity.45
In this line of decisions regarding the applicability of Section 7 in the
context of employee safety and health complaints, the NLRB summarized that
37 N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Systems Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984).
38 Prill 1, 755 F.2d at 951.
39 Id. at 952.
40 Meyers Industries, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 882 (1986) (Meyers II).
41 Id.
42 Prill v. N.L.R.B., 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Prill II).
43 T. Steele Constr., Inc. and Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 348
NLRB No. 79 (2006). See also In re U.S. Postal Service, 338 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1057 (2003) ("[T]he
Respondent may not lawfully seize upon an incident.., to retaliate against one for engaging in
activity protected by Section 7 of the Act, such as filing an OSHA complaint."); In re W. Va. Steel
Corp., 337 N.L.R.B. 34 (2001); Systems with Reliability, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 757, 760 (1996) ("By
saying that he would contact OSHA, Yuhas engaged in concerted activity for the purpose of mu-
tual aid and protection .. . he engaged in concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the
Act.").
44 T. Steele Constr., Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 79 at 20.
45 Stevens Constr. Co., 350 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 1 (2007).
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the worker's individual actions are concerted when the "evidence supports a
finding that the concerns expressed by the individual are the logical outgrowth
of the concerns expressed by the group.
'46
To be protected by Section 7, the employee need not have the eloquence
of Daniel Webster nor eschew self-interest. In fact, the employee can be venal
and not really concerned about fellow workers: "Section 7 requires neither altru-
ism, nor unequivocal solidarity, on the part of an individual employee who
seeks help from coworkers with respect to working conditions.7
IV. THE ABSURD CONSEQUENCE OF THE BIZARRE BIFURCATION OF SECTION
7: THE UNAVAILABILITY OF SECTION 7 IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EMPLOYER'S
DELIBERATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Perhaps the most outrageous consequence of the bizarre bifurcation of
Section 7 is the NLRB's refusal to extend Section 7 protections to employees
who complain of sexual harassment.
The emergent recent trend is that filing a discrimination complaint with
the EEOC or state or local human rights agency is not protected under Section 7,
especially when it is undertaken by an employee whom the NLRB regards as
acting only for her own individual benefit. It was not always so. In Hotel and
Restaurant Employees, the Board held in 1980 that filing a sexual discrimina-
tion claim with the state employment commission was protected under the
NLRA. 48 This is especially so when the employee can also point to a fair em-
ployment practices provision in the collective bargaining agreement.49
But, congruent with the many radical decisions of the Bush II Board,
the Board repudiated its long-standing position in 2004 in Holling Press and
Boncraft-Holling Printing Group.50 Employee Fabozzi believed that she was
being unlawfully harassed by her work group leader. She learned that employee
Garcia may have also been harassed by Mr. Leon, the group leader, but Ms.
Garcia was reluctant to testify in support of Ms. Fabozzi's complaint with the
New York State Division of Human Rights. When the employer learned that
Ms. Fabozzi had approached Ms. Garcia about being a supporting witness, Ms.
Fabozzi was terminated. The NLRB found that no Section 8(a)(1) unfair labor
practice had been committed. Dismissing the complaint, the Board ruled that
Ms. Fabozzi was not engaged in Section 7 protected activity, because the com-
46 Mike Yurosek & Sons, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038 (1992).
47 Holling Press, 343 NLRB 301, 306 (2004) (Member Liebman, dissenting).
48 Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 28, 252 N.L.R.B. 1124, 1134 (1980); see also Boese
Hilbum Electric Service Company, 313 N.L.R.B. 372, 373 (1993) (employee wrongfully dis-
charged after assisting fellow employee in filing charges of sexual harassment against the em-
ployer); General Teamsters Local Union 528, 237 N.L.R.B. 258 (1978).
49 Milton v. Scrivener, 901 F. Supp. 1541 (1994), affd, 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995).
50 343 N.L.R.B. 301 (2004); see also Abramson LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 171 (2005).
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plainant only sought to benefit herself.51 The Board held that her activity "was
not engaged in for the purposes of mutual aid or protection. ' '52 The NLRB cha-
racterized Ms. Fabozzi's conduct as purely self-interested, without any concern
for the wellbeing of fellow employees. The Board found that it was entirely too
speculative and remote to presume that Ms. Garcia might, at some future point,
suffer an injury and turn to Ms. Fabozzi for help.
This plainly denies the reality of the dynamics of sexual harassment in
the workplace and leaves every employee subject to unlawful harassment with-
out the protections of Section 7. As Board Member Liebman forcefully stated
in her pointed dissent: "The majority sets an arbitrary standard, at odds with
what our case law contemplates. It treats sexual harassment at work as merely
an individual concern, even when victims seek help from coworkers. That view
is simply unacceptable .... As a recent study observed, 'Sexual harassment is a
fact of life for many working women, with some studies suggesting that work-
related sexual harassment may affect as many as one in two women at some
point in the work lives."
53
The only way an employee could be protected by Section 7 from retalia-
tion for filing a complaint with a federal agency about harassment in the
workplace is if, in her claim, she carefully alluded to prohibitions of unlawful
discrimination in the language of the collective bargaining agreement.
Similarly, individual contentions of disability discrimination have been
held protected under Section 7 when the claims are grounded in rights based on
a collective bargaining agreement. 54 In Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed a ruling that an individual claim of disability discrimination was
protected by Section 7, primarily because the rights alleged to have been vi-
olated were based on the collective bargaining agreement.
55
V. CONCLUSION
Beginning in 1979 with the Krispy Kreme decision, and reinforced in
the subsequent Peabody Galion, Truex, and Zartic decisions, the circuit courts
of appeals and the NLRB have arbitrarily excluded workers who file state work-
ers' compensation claims from Section 7 protections. The circuit courts and the
Board have made the unnecessary, and highly unreasonable, assumption that
workers who file for workers' compensation will be protected by state laws and
that federal protections are inappropriate and unnecessary.
This crabbed reasoning flows from an unnaturally narrow view of the
NLRA. The Board reasons that a workers' compensation claim only benefits a
51 Holling Press, 343 N.L.R.B. at 301.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 304-06.
54 Milton, 901 F. Supp. 1541.
55 Id. at 1118.
[Vol. I111
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss2/5
2009] THE BIZARRE BIFURCATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE NLRA 409
single employee, and accordingly, precludes the application of the NLRA.
However, this ignores the underlying reality compelling the employee to file for
workers' compensation in the first place. Quite often, the stimulus that required
the employee to file for workers' compensation, such as unsafe, unhealthy
working conditions and management exploitation and intimidation of vulnerable
workers, will constitute the unfair labor practices that the NLRA was designed
to prevent: to preclude Section 7 protections for the employee undermines the
very purpose of the NLRA.
Eventually, the United States Supreme Court must definitively resolve
the bizarre bifurcation of Section 7, expressly repudiate the NLRB and lower
courts' decisions that have removed from the scope of Section 7 workers' com-
pensation and discrimination complaints and restore Section 7 protections to all
individual employee initiatives.
The Court need only reaffirm the essence of its classic decision in 1984
in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems Inc.56 (which, in turn, was premised on the
Court's broad and integrated reading of Section 7 concerted protected activities
in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB57), recognizing that employees who supported enhanced
federal minimum wage laws for other workers would themselves indirectly ben-
efit in future contract negotiations, as any legislative increase in minimum wag-
es for low wage workers would raise the floor from which the higher wage
workers could bargain for proportionately greater wage increases from their
particular employer. In other words, it was foreseeable, and not "speculative"
that all workers would benefit, albeit indirectly, from one worker's, or one class
of workers' cause.
For now, to maintain the protections of Section 7 of the NLRA for em-
ployees who individually resort to external agencies with complaints of unlaw-
ful discrimination, for example, it is imperative that the individual employee
accentuate the relevant language of the pertinent collective bargaining agree-
ment that prohibits unlawful discrimination. Otherwise, in the wake of the
NLRB's 2004 decision in Holling Press, it is likely that the NLRB will not ac-
cord Section 7 protections to individuals retaliated against for filing employ-
ment discrimination allegations with the United States Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, or state or local equivalent agencies.
Alexander Dumas' Musketeers subscribed to the axiomatic principle of
"All for One, and One for All." In the early twentieth century, this truth was
reaffirmed by the Wobblies' cry that "An injury to one is an injury to all."
Well, apparently not so, say the current NLRB and some of the more brittle,
rigid circuit courts of appeals, with their atomized Darwinian law of the jungle
ethos of every man for himself, further isolating the most vulnerable injured and
56 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
57 437 U.S. 556 (1978). But see Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 N.L.R.B. 182, 186-
87 (1982) (finding against employees asserting 8(a)(1) unfair labor practices by the employer
hotel casino, which prohibited employees from distributing literature about Employee Stock Own-
ership Plan proposals without first being approved for distribution by the employer.).
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harassed workers. Accordingly, after three decades of decisions by the NLRB
and the circuit courts vitiating the Section 7 rights of employees who pursue
workers' compensation claims, it will take a decision by the Supreme Court to
restore those Section 7 protections to employees injured at work.
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